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POLITICIZING THE VIRUS. SECTARIAN TENSIONS IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE TIME OF COVID-19 
Introduction. –Interpreting the words of the anthropologist Marcel 
Mauss (mentioned in Barbera, 2020), Covid-19 has entered the global 
system as a “total social fact”1, i.e. something capable of influencing and 
determining a set of phenomena, involving most of the operating mech-
anisms of the community of reference. In this sense, the “total social 
fact” therefore makes it possible to interpret apparently distant and dif-
ferent “pieces” of the same society and to reflect on the political, cul-
tural, economic and symbolic dynamics of each State. Health and public 
hygiene measures, for example, are now political issues (but perhaps they 
were already but with more media discretion); the same individual free-
dom has been trapped in emergency political dynamics, as the division 
between friends and enemies within the same nation overlaps the 
boundaries between groups competing for power and influence. Where 
there is no shared context (the Constitution, the Nation, the Homeland, 
the Republic, etc.) which allows groups to compete, even an epidemic or 
a pandemic such as the current one (May 2020) can become a pretext to 
validate not only economic, political, social, but also religious divisions. 
From the assault on supermarkets, to speculation on the prices of masks, 
to the statements of politicians, to the export, logistics and tourism crisis, 
to the economic policies of embargoes, which persist despite the health 
crises of these times, to the  political arm wrestling between states on oil, 
nuclear or other issues, Covid-19 is our best mirror and we should have 
                         

 Although the result of common reflections, the contribution is due to Monica 
Morazzoni for the paragraphs Introduction and Mapping Covid-19 incidence in Iran and to 
Giovanna Giulia Zavettieri for the paragraphs Pandemic and geopolitics in Iran: sec-
tarian issues and Conclusion. 
1According to Mauss, the total social fact par excellence is a gift, as it is capable of 
uniting the practices and the frames of meaning referable to mythopoieic, economic, 
political, expressive and religious aspects (in Barbera, 2020).   
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the courage to look at it without lowering our gaze. 
In short, Covid-19 allows the interpretation of apparently distant and 
different “pieces” of the same society, like the Islamic one, which we 
deal with in this essay with particular attention to sectarian tensions in 
the Middle East that Covid-19 is exacerbating. From February 24th, Iraq, 
Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia began to announce 
their first cases of infection. In all six countries, the earliest coronavirus 
patients had recently traveled to Iran. Iranian officials have given con-
flicting accounts of how the virus first arrived in Qom, a city of about 
1.2 million people, part of a Shiite pilgrimage circuit. The virus spread 
quickly in Qom, from which it moved to other cities in Iran, and then to 
the Gulf. The not unpredictable consequence was that many Middle 
Eastern countries then began using the Covid-19 crisis as a pretext to 
track the movement of Shiite citizens, requiring them to report recent 
travel to Iran. The Covid-19 crisis now appears to be amplifying anti-
Shia prejudice and discrimination.  
The present essay aims to be an overview of the main geopolitical and 
geo-economic consequences of Covid-19 in Iran in the Middle East, par-
ticularly focused on the aforementioned discrimination towards Shiites 
and the alteration of numbers referring to the infected. 
The methodology adopted involved finding an updated bibliography 
on the topic Covid-19 and comparing statistical sources on the number 
of cases and deaths in Iran. Of particular value was the consultation, on 
GIS maps, of data processed in real time by John Hopkins University re-
lating to the status of Covid-19 in Iran and of the WHO datasets and ep-
idemiological maps developed by Iranian doctors. Sources of media in-
formation on the topic of sectarian issues of Islam have been joined by 
semi-structured interviews administered to a sample of Shiites who are 
not necessarily Iranian. The studies carried out have allowed reflection 
on the relationship between the spread of the virus and the mobility of 
Shiite pilgrims and businesspeople in Iran as well as in the Middle East 
region.  
 
Pandemic and geopolitics in Iran: sectarian issues. – In February, Iran 
emerged in the Middle Eastern context as the epicenter of the COVID-
19 pandemic, putting the government in trouble on several fronts and 
demonstrating its inability to manage the epidemic (Tabatabai, 2020). Of-
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ficials downplayed the seriousness of the crisis even as reports surfaced 
of Iranians dying by the hundreds. The death toll soon surpassed 1,000 
and reached more than 5,000 by mid-April, according to official figures, 
which no doubt underestimated the body count.  
The outbreak of Covid-19 coincided with two important milestones: 
the anniversary of the Iranian revolution on February 11 and parliamen-
tary elections on February 212. On the occasion of these events, the gov-
ernment did not make public the already present outbreak of Covid-19 
in the country, as it feared that it would have an impact on participation 
in these two events. Although less than 43% of Iranian electors came to 
the elections (the lowest participation rate since the 1979 revolution), the 
gathering of people/voters certainly did not favor the containment of 
the virus (Wright, 2020). However, the government, which did not post-
pone the parliamentary elections despite evidence of the contagion, re-
leased images of people/voters wearing masks, as if to demonstrate sen-
sitivity towards the virus and the public‟s sense of responsibility towards 
the epidemic. The opposition party, instead, denounced the action of the 
government and interior ministry to hold parliamentary elections with 
the virus already in place, politicizing Covid-193. In particular, the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 4, an influential branch of the armed 
forces (often aligned with the conservative religious establishment), tak-
ing note of mounting public anger at the government, has rushed to pre-
sent itself as the actor more capable of containing the outbreak (Tabata-
bai, 2020). Whatever public health merits of the Revolutionary Guards‟ 
                         
2 During the parliamentary elections, the victory of the most radical fringe of the 
Iranian establishment was recorded. These results guarantee a future conservative gov-
ernment (presidential elections are scheduled for 2021).  
3The exploitation of the virus for political purposes was also confirmed by another 
contrast between Iran and the United States: after the elections, Supreme Leader Aya-
tollah Ali Khamenei accused Iran‟s enemies of exaggerating Covid-19‟s threat to scare 
voters. Also, according to Khamenei, negative propaganda about the virus grew before 
the elections to dissuade Iranian voters. At the same time, US Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo denounced the Iranian government for misinforming the public about the 
numbers affected or killed by the virus. 
4 Volunteers from the Iranian paramilitary corps engaged for defending the order 
established with the 1979 Islamic revolution. They are the guardians of the Khomeinist 
Islamic revolution, better known as IRGC or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The 
name in Farsi is Pasdaran. 
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actions exists, the public relations strategy is clear: the IRGC hopes to 
gain from this crisis at the expense of Hassan Rouhani government and 
his allies. In this sense, the Revolutionary Guards could further under-
mine the government and help conservatives eliminate moderates in next 
year‟s presidential election. The epidemic also reopened the issue of U.S. 
sanctions on the Iranian economy which limit its ability to obtain the 
supplies needed to fight Covid-19. In this situation, Iran urged the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) to approve a 5 billion dollars loan to 
combat Covid-19. This request, strongly desired by the moderate fringe 
of the Iranian government, would result in the loss of control by the 
theocratic government and perhaps also the defeat of the conservatives5 
(Rossi, 2020). However, the IMF issue is connected to the internal politi-
cal crisis in Iran. In fact, there are “moderate” political formations in the 
government, but the parliamentary majority is made up of conservatives 
who follow the Supreme Leader and, above all, some fringes of the 
Pasdaran. In order to survive, the moderates need popular support and 
therefore the Covid-19 crisis becomes an opportunity for them to assert 
themselves: the moderates lead the country to surrender financial inde-
pendence  as a final move to defeat the conservatives, and in Covid-19 
they find their opportunity. In fact, this attempt to politicize Covid-19 
led to nothing since Trump denied the loan6.  
With regard to the politicization of Covid-19 for sectarian religious is-
sues, it should be remembered that the first epidemic cases were traced 
to the holy city of Qom (Salehi-Isfahani, 2020), whose Shiite seminaries 
and Sayyidah Fatima al-Ma‟suma Shrine draw aspiring clerics and devout 
pilgrims from across the Shiite world. According to the Iranian govern-
ment, the first deaths from Covid-19 in Qom (a city of about 1.2 million 
people) were registered on February 19, 2020, but by February 27 cases 
                         
5The request for help to the IMF would provide for the presence of inspectors in 
Tehran to monitor spending items and therefore government revenues should be used 
to restore the commitment and everything that is considered superfluous should be 
eliminated (Rossi, 2020).  
6According to the national newspaper Arman (in Lesani, 2020), «[i]t is not possible to 
stay at home because hunger is more deadly than Coronavirus and you cannot remain in quaran-
tine on an empty stomach [...] It is time for all governmental and non-governmental institutions, 
large and large state-owned companies, to lend a hand. We shouldn‟t politicize Coronavirus. Now 
is not the time to try to settle the accounts between factions […]». 
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had been reported in 24 of Iran‟s 31 provinces. On March 16, Rouhani 
ordered many of the country‟s most important shrines to close, a deci-
sion unprecedented as shrines are typically open 24 hours a day, and the 
decision was denounced by clerics, sparking demonstrations by con-
servative Iranians (Marizad, 2020). Meanwhile, the virus continued to in-
fect the population and, according to published data on March 23 more 
than 23,000 people had been infected and more than 1,800 died, includ-
ing at least a dozen government officials (Al Jazeera, 2020).  
The Covid-19 crisis amplified anti-Shiite prejudice and discrimination 
especially after the presence of the virus has been detected in Saudi Ara-
bia, in the predominantly Shiite eastern region of Qatif. The Saudi 
Health Ministry immediately called on people who had traveled to Iran 
to declare themselves to authorities. Dozens of Saudi Shiites responded 
to the health ministry‟s request by admitting that they had traveled to 
Iran. Though travel to Iran is a crime in Saudi Arabia, some Saudis travel 
there via countries of transit. As Covid-19 cases in the kingdom have ris-
en, some of their countrymen have taken to Twitter to blast them as trai-
tors and call for their execution (Matthiesen, 2020). Meanwhile, Bahrain 
has begun using the coronavirus crisis as a pretext to track the move-
ments of its Shiite citizens and has asked those who have traveled to Iran 
to identify themselves by calling a hotline (Al Arabiya, 2020). For the 
government of Bahrain, travel to Iran is not a crime as it is in Saudi Ara-
bia, however also here Shiites fear repercussions7. Covid-19 becomes an 
excuse to demonize Shiites: the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi 
Arabia, on his official Twitter account for Saudi Arabia‟s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, condemned Iran for «creating a health threat which en-
dangers mankind»8. 
Bahrain‟s interior minister accused Iran of «biological aggression that 
is criminalized by international law» for covering up the outbreak and 
failing to stamp Bahraini travelers‟ passports (MEE, 2020). Even in the 
United Arab Emirates, was claimed that all coronavirus cases in the re-
gion were linked to Iran – even though the UAE‟s first COVID-19 cases 
                         
7Both in Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain, Shiite populations are often politically mar-
ginalized, stigmatized for their religious beliefs and practices and suspected of loyalty to 
Iran (Matthiesen, 2020). 
8 https://twitter.com/KSAMOFA/status/1235646719267721216. 
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were Chinese tourists from Wuhan reported on January 29th, well before 
the outbreak in Qom became public (Gambrell, 2020).  
To amplify the anti-Shiite prejudice and discrimination in the Middle 
East there is also the story of Lebanon, where the nation‟s most power-
ful political and military force, Hezbollah, has strong ties to Iran. There-
fore, Lebanon allowed flights from Iran to continue until the second 
week of March. Iran‟s support of Hezbollah is fiercely contested, and the 
rival parties have politicized the virus (Apnews, 2020), using it to criticize 
Iran‟s influence in the country. According to some sources (Aboulenein, 
2020; Matthiesen, 2020; Mubasher, 2020; France24, 2020) 
  
on February 21, Lebanon confirmed its first case of COVID-19, a 
45-year-old woman who had recently returned from Qom. On 
February 24, the governments of Iraq, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait 
announced their first cases of coronavirus infection, and by March 
2, Qatar and Saudi Arabia had reported cases as well; in all six 
countries, the earliest coronavirus patients had recently traveled to 
Iran.  
 
The Iranian government‟s answer to the Covid outbreak was slow 
and the president did not issue travel restrictions, continuing to allow 
Shiite pilgrims in and out of the country.  
According to tradition, the Shiites commonly make a pilgrimage to 
the Imamzadeh shrines, as in the case of the Sayyidah Fatima al-Ma‟suma 
Shrine in Qom. Here, men and women pray for cures for their ailments, 
solutions for their problems, as well as forgiveness for their sins (Better-
idge, 2002, pp. 276-289). On the occasion of visits to the sanctuaries, it is 
traditional for devotees to stop for hours or days to pray in the mosque 
and to perform rituals such as touching and kissing the tombs of the 
Imams (and their relatives) considered close to Allah. Consequently, dur-
ing the early days of the coronavirus epidemic, shrines became viral vec-
tors, infecting Shiite pilgrims – some of whom had underlying health 
conditions or were elderly – who then were later accused of spreading 
the disease throughout the country and in the Middle Eastern region. 
If on the one hand it is true that there is a movement of Shiites for re-
ligious tourism within the country, on the other hand it is true that, be-
tween February 2019 and 2020, Iran welcomed 8 million tourists from 
Europe, China, Azerbaijan, Iraq and Turkey. In particular, Chinese inves-
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tors represent a market that moves nearly 65 million people in the Mid-
dle East. Relations between Beijing and Tehran are not only economic 
and commercial, but also tourist. In fact, the Chinese are among the 
main visitors to the country. Iranian officials stated that the virus arrived 
in Qom both through Chinese Muslim students in the city‟s religious 
seminaries and through Chinese workers building a high-speed rail line 
there. 
Another aspect to consider concerns the way, by the Shiites, to carry 
out religious tourism: it is never itinerant tourism that provides for visit-
ing several sanctuaries located in different states. According to some in-
terviews given to Azerbaijan Shiites, the Shiite pilgrim travels mainly to 
the city of Karbala in Iraq for two reasons: first of all, the city is the pre-
ferred destination to make the pilgrimage considered most important in 
the life of a Shiite9. Secondly, the festivity that moves hundreds of thou-
sands of pilgrims is the Muharram, which in 2019 took place starting 
from September 1 and in 2020 will take place starting from August 20. In 
addition to Karbala, Shiite religious tourist destinations are also present 
in Iraq and Syria, as shown in Figure 1.   
Regarding the accusation of Saudi Arabia towards Iran about the 
spread of Covid-19 by the Shiites, it needs to be carefully evaluated as an 
asymmetrical conflict exists between Iran and Saudi Arabia and therefore 
it is not convenient for a Saudi Shiite to visit an Iranian shrine. 
The question of who caused the spread of the virus in the Middle 
Eastern context is particularly complex, mainly because there is no real 
data relating to the movement of people entering and leaving Iran and or 
in any of the states of the Middle East. The only fact is the political ex-
ploitation of Covid-19 to exacerbate social, economic and religious issues 
within Iran on the eve of the presidential election. Externally, however, 
the Shiite issue is a pretext for further isolating Iran in the region in favor 
of US policy which operates openly against the Rouhani government. 
 
 
 
                         
9For Shiites, Karbala represents the religious destination that should be seen at least 
once in a lifetime. Every year hundreds of thousands of pilgrims go to this city, where 
the Imam Husayn Mosque is located. 
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Fig. 1 – The main destinations of Shiite religious tourism 
 
Source: elaboration by Giovanna Giulia Zavettieri, 2020 
 
Mapping Covid-19 incidence in Iran. – Currently (May 2020), Iran is the 
first country for Covid-19 contagions for numbers of infections in the 
Middle East region, although the number of infections and deaths has 
been concealed by the Rouhani government on several occasions. Disin-
formation is linked to the country‟s fragile political, economic and social 
balances. The conservative political front has an interest in undermining 
the moderate blockade of Rouhani through internal media propaganda 
that highlighted the poor management of the pandemic (Tabatabai, 
2020). At the economic level, there is a system that has long been in cri-
sis due to the US embargo and today10, in the midst of a pandemic, Iran 
faces serious circumstances as trade contracts, borders with important 
partners like Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey are closed, and China‟s oil 
                         
10In May 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump imposed sanctions on Iran that 
damaged the country‟s economy, depleted its foreign exchange reserves and severely 
limited its ability to respond to a health crisis. Add to this the fact, in the midst of a 
pandemic, the fall in the price of oil. U.S. sanctions have reduced Iran‟s average 
purchasing power by nearly 20% since 2018 and the ongoing health crisis will further 
reduce that figure (Salehi-Isfahani, 2020). 
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demand, a quarter of all Iranian trade11, drops (Wright, 2020). In society, 
the Iranian middle class thrived during the oil boom of the 2000s, ac-
counting for 60% of the total population in 2012. In 2018, however, the 
middle class shrank to 53% of the population. Currently, it represents 
less than 50% and two to three million families of the middle class em-
ployed have seen their incomes decrease by 15% during 2020. Unem-
ployment has put further pressure on Rouhani, as there are between 
three and four million unemployed workers, a figure that could increase 
if the Covid-19 emergency persists (Salehi-Isfahani, 2020). 
Especially in the first phase of the spread of the epidemic (February-
March), the actual number of Covid-19 deaths and infections was con-
cealed by the government which ordered the ban on news reporting for 
fear of riots and popular outrage. The Civil Registry of Tehran itself, ac-
cording to a directive from the Ministry of Intelligence, has been closed 
to prevent the leakage of information on the death toll. The universities 
of medical sciences were also warned not to provide data (Lesani, 2020). 
According to the government, the carrier of the virus may have been 
a trader who traveled between Qom and Wuhan, China. It has been es-
timated that the epidemic started between three to six weeks before Feb-
ruary 19 (the date of the first two deaths in Iran) and, eight days after the 
first reported death, the virus has spread to 24 of the country‟s 31 prov-
inces with a number of cases that has increased day by day. 
The development of epidemiological maps (Figure 2), built with the 
official data provided by the Iranian health authorities, allows:  
a) analysis the case distribution by provinces and the incidence rates, 
                         
11 Since 2016, China and Iran have increased trade volumes and Beijing has replaced 
Moscow as the largest trading partner of Iran and the other Middle Eastern states. 
However, relations between Tehran and Beijing go beyond the economic and 
commercial aspects. Iran is among the major beneficiaries of the Belt and Road 
Initiative. Indeed, Iran‟s geographical position makes the country a land link between 
China and the states of Central Asia, which for Chinese investors represent a market of 
almost 65 million people, and the Caucasus region (Voccia, 2020). In addition, China is 
investing in Iranian transport and infrastructure with agreements that provide for the 
electrification of 900 km of railway lines, 400 km of high-speed lines and the 
strengthening of the infrastructure of Tabriz (industrial city of Iran north-west from 
which a 2500 km gas pipeline that arrives in Ankara), an important passage of the new 
Silk Road towards Europe (Dinucci, 2020). 
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cases/100,000 population by provinces in the period between February 
19 and March 912; 
b) reflection on the relationship between the spread of the virus and 
the mobility of Shiite pilgrims in Iranian holy places; 
c) reflection on the relationship between the spread of the virus and 
the mobility of tourists and international workers in Iran. 
During the first 20 days of the epidemic, 7,161 cases of COVID-19 
were reported in the country, for a cumulated rate of 8.9 cases/100,000 
population, reaching up to 1,234 cases on March 6, 2020. From the 
maps, it is clear that infection in the country is occurring from north-
central provinces such as Tehran and Qom. However, all the provinces 
have been affected, and rates ranged from 0.8 (Boushehr) to 61.8 cas-
es/100,000 population (Qom). The highest number of cases have been 
reported in Tehran, 1,945, followed by Qom, 712, and by Mazandaran, 
with 633. Qom is on the border with Markazi and Semnan, provinces 
with rates from 27.2 to 34.9 cases/100,000 population (Arab-Mazar Z. et 
al., 2020).  
The provinces of Qom and Khorasan Razavi are the favorite destina-
tions for Shiite pilgrims, national and international, for the presence of 
important places of faith. However, in the period considered (February 
19 - March 9), the two provinces show a substantial difference in the 
number of Covid-19 confirmed cases, with a trend comprised, in abso-
lute terms, between 500 thousand and 1 million units of Qom, one of 
the two Iranian holy cities (the other being Mashhad in Khorasan Raza-
vi) and the 100 - 500 thousand units of Khorasan Razavi. There is also a 
substantial difference in the incidence of Covid-19 on the population: 
over 50 cases/100,000 population in Qom, from 1 to 5 cases/100,000 
population in Khorasan Razavi13. This suggests that Shiite pilgrims can-
                         
12The writer thought it interesting to analyze this specific time span, because it relat-
ed to the Covid-19 diffusion phase 1 in which the Government did not initiate any vi-
rus containment action, or continued to allow outbound, inbound and the domestic 
tourism, in addition to gatherings of people. 
13The population of Qoom amounts to 1.2 million inhabitants, that of Khorasan 
Razavi to 6.7 million (data 2019) (www.citypopulation.de). The capital city of Khorasan 
Razavi, Mashhad, is the second-largest holy city in the world, attracting more than 20 
million tourists and pilgrims every year, many of whom come to pay homage to the 
Imam Reza shrine (the eighth Shiite Imam).  
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not be considered the only carriers of transmission of the virus within 
Iran. Moreover, in the months of January and February there were no 
particular religious holidays (e.g. Muharram, see paragraph 2) to cause 
the presence of international flows of Shiite pilgrims in Iran. 
 
Fig. 2 – Epidemiological maps of the case distribution by provinces and the incidence rates, 
cases/100,000 population by provinces (February 19 - March 9, 2020) 
 
 
Source: Arab-Mazar Z. et al., 2020 
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Due to its proximity to Tehran, Qom is a destination for international 
arrivals and is affected by local mobility to and from the capital. In 
Mashhad despite being a deeply conservative city, there is no shortage of 
foreign investments and therefore foreign presences, not necessarily Shi-
ite pilgrims. 
In addition to the two centers of Shiite spirituality, Iran includes cities 
such as Tabriz (province of Eastern Azerbaijan), Isfahan (in the homon-
ymous province) and Shiraz (province of Fars) which are destinations for 
foreign tourism but, above all, for Chinese investments. For some time 
now, they have been cities crossed by a lively mobility of businesspeople 
passing through. Crossings, however, were not limited during the first 
period of spread of the virus. Figure 2 shows an equal (if not superior) 
distribution of Covid-19 cases between the province of Khorasan Razavi 
and those of East Azerbaijan, Isfahan, and Fars. The incidence rate it is 
even higher in the province of Isfahan than in Khorasan Razavi. 
Regarding the charge of exportation of the virus by Shiites, for exam-
ple to Saudi Arabia, it appears implausible considering both the objective 
difficulties for a Shiite Iranian to enter Saudi Arabia (see paragraph 2) 
and because in January, China signed new economic agreements for the 
oil trade with Riyadh, an element that suggests flows of Chinese entering 
the country. Therefore it seems more likely that the spread of Covid-19 
in the Gulf countries may be more likely attributed to the mobility of 
Chinese businesspeople and other nationalities than Shiites.  
Three months after the outbreak of the pandemic, according to the 
Iranian Ministry of Health spokesman Kianoush Jajanpour‟s bulletin 
(Redazione ANSA, 13 maggio 2020) there were more than 112 thousand 
cases14 with almost 7 thousand deaths confirmed since the beginning of 
the pandemic (Figure 3), with about 90 thousand patients healed and 600 
thousand tests carried out15.  
 
 
 
                         
14 114 thousand for the WHO Dashboard, https://covid19.who.int/. 
15In Italy on the same date, there were 223 thousand cases, with 31 thousand 
deaths, 115 thousand recovered and almost 3 million tests carried out (Ministero della 
Salute, 14 May 2020). 
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Fig. 3 – Trends in confirmed cases and Covid-19 deaths from 19 February to 14 May 2020 
 
Source: https://covid19.who.int/, last consultation 14 May 2020 
 
The already worrying lack of transparency has been further exacerbat-
ed by Tehran‟s late implementation of containment measures. Since the 
presence of the disease was detected in Qom, the Ministry of Health did 
not immediately impose quarantine on cities, considering this measure 
obsolete, and did not adequately identify, isolate or treat people with the 
virus. As a result, the infection spread to other parts of the country. Also, 
the initial refusal by religious officials to close the Fatima al-Ma‟suma 
Shrine in Qom and other monuments, a refusal confirmed by Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei16, favored the spread.  
Today, with the Covid-19 epidemic still underway, Iran is facing an 
economic challenge internally, linked to the depreciation of its currency 
which has been in difficulty for some time, as well as politics, due to the 
growing mistrust of the moderate government.  
 
Conclusion. – The spread of Covid-19 in the Middle Eastern region is 
not attributable only to Shiites, but to an international mobility of people 
and business people who gravitated to the area already in the months 
preceding the outbreak of the epidemic. The central theme of the Covid-
19 issue in Iran concerns the internal mismanagement of the spread of 
the virus. In particular, with regard to external relations, the Rouhani 
government, for the reasons outlined above, did not promptly close its 
borders, thus endangering the nearby war zones, namely Iraq, Syria and 
Yemen. 
Covid-19 has put global trade on hold, placed half of the world popu-
                         
16According to the supreme leader, any attempt to restrict access to the shrine 
would have supported the US conspiracy that the holy city is unsafe (Afkhami, 2020). 
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lation in confinement and has the potential to topple governments and 
reshape diplomatic relations (Alaaldin, 2020). At this historic moment, as 
declared by the United Nations, it is above all the areas of war that worry 
about the impact that the pandemic could have. The Middle East, agitat-
ed by multiple wars, raises further concerns about the multiple unre-
solved issues of Syria and Iraq. 
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the month 
of March recorded, with 103 deaths, the lowest civilian death toll since 
the conflict started in 2011. The key to the credibility of the multiple Syr-
ian administrations including the Damascus government, the autono-
mous Kurdish administration in the northeast and the jihadist-led alli-
ance that runs Idlib, is in the demonstration of the efficiency of the Syri-
an state and that therefore all territories should be returned under his 
government. However, the pandemic and global mobilization could lead 
to the departure of US-led troops from Syria and neighboring Iraq, al-
lowing the Islamic State jihadist17 group to intensify its attacks18 (Bang-
kok Post, 2020; Van Ostaeyen, 2020). 
The same is true of Yemen, where Houthi rebels initially responded 
positively to the UN appeal for a ceasefire, as did neighbouring Saudi 
Arabia, which leads a military coalition in support of the government. 
That rare glimmer of hope in the five-year-old conflict was short-lived, 
as it escalated again in the following weeks when Saudi air defences in-
tercepted ballistic missiles over Riyadh and a border city fired by the 
Iran-backed rebels. In response, Saudi-led coalition retaliated by striking 
Houthi targets in the rebel-held capital Sana‟a. Flare-ups in Yemen could 
                         
17«A first reaction by the group was to define it as divine punishment for crimes 
against Muslims. China was hit first, in IS‟ view as punishment for its ongoing crimes 
against its Uyghur population. When Iran followed, the reaction was that it was the na-
tion‟s devious interpretation of Islam that led to this onslaught. Shia Islam has always 
been regarded as a deviant sect, one that even stands outside the realms of Islam as 
such (at least perceived so by the Islamic State). And then, when Europe and the US 
were hit, the explanation was that God punished the “crusader states” for their crimes 
against Islam throughout the Middle East» (Van Ostaeyen, 2020). 
18«The overall rate of attacks throughout Syria and Iraq has also increased dramati-
cally since April as we see in the numbers reported by Aaron Zelin. IS made a huge leap 
in claimed attacks in April compared to prior months in Iraq and Syria: Jan: 88, Feb: 93, 
Mar: 101, Apr: 151» (https://twitter.com/azelin/status/1256215578882330626).  
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compound the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, facilitating a coro-
navirus outbreak of catastrophic proportions, since in Yemen the health 
infrastructure has collapsed, water is a rare commodity and 24 million 
people currently require humanitarian assistance (Bangkok Post, 2020). 
In conclusion, the spread of the coronavirus in Yemen or Syria, as well 
as in the camps in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, hosting millions of Syr-
ian refugees, is likely to be devastating. Both from a security and humani-
tarian perspective, the pandemic in the Middle East is shaping up to be a 
crisis of epic proportions (Matthiesen, 2020). 
On a regional scale, there is no value in placing blame on one state or 
another for the spread of Covid-19. The problem in this area is related to 
geopolitical instability and the political-economic coalitions that have 
formed. There is a pro-American bloc backed by Saudi Arabia and a pro-
Chinese bloc with Iran and Oman for investments related to the New 
Silk Road.  
It is too simplistic to blame Shia pilgrims for spreading the virus. 
Covid-19 circulates in the Middle East due to human mobility, globaliza-
tion and the Chinese presence in these territories. After all, new territori-
alisation and reterritorialization processes are underway in the Middle 
East region and it is now clear that China‟s positioning is investing in lo-
cal infrastructure, buying gas and oil and dreaming of the return of the 
Silk Road. The reality, pre and post Covid-19, is that of a contrast be-
tween the US and China in Middle Eastern territory. 
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Politicizzare il virus. Tensioni settarie in Medio Oriente al tempo del Covid-19. – Il 
Covid-19 ha esacerbato le tensioni settarie in Medio Oriente dopo la sua 
diffusione in Iran. Dal 24 febbraio Iraq, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar e 
Arabia Saudita hanno annunciato i loro primi casi di infezione imputando-
ne la causa a viaggiatori e/o pellegrini iraniani. Il presente saggio ha voluto 
dimostrare, anche attraverso carte epidemiologiche relative ai casi e 
all‟incidenza del virus nelle 31 province iraniane, l‟insostenibilità 
dell‟ipotesi che la diffusione del virus sia unicamente legata al movimento 
di pellegrini sciiti all‟interno dell‟Iran e, più in generale, del Medio Oriente. 
 
Keywords. – Covid-19, Iran, Shia  
 
 
IULM University of Milan, Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici  
monica.morazzoni@iulm.it 
 
Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Remote Sensing and Geography Information System Center  
giovannagiulia.zavettieri@gmail.com 
 
